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Abstract:
The article discusses how the use of long-range precision strike (LRPS) systems and other technological innovations have the potential
to change the way sea wars are conducted. The increasing use of remotely piloted and autonomous air, surface, and sub-surface
platforms can also impact sea wars. Advanced information and communications technologies also have an impact on warfare.
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In the hands of adversaries, long-range strike systems could drastically alter the conduct of war at sea
The constant evolution of military technology has driven continuous change in the character of warfare, to the benefit of the militaries
that adapt the most successfully. More than 70 years have passed since a major maritime conflict. During that time many new
technologies have emerged, with few combat tests to provide reliable guideposts regarding what will prove successful now and in a
future conflict.
Over the past few decades, there has been a good deal of thinking about the progress and technological revolution of military affairs.
We must reinvigorate discussions about the core of our craft: fighting and winning wars at and from the sea. As we shape the future
U.S. Fleet in the next 10 to 15 years, a number of key questions must be addressed: How should we think about naval warfare today,
and what do the conditions and concepts that spring from this thinking mean for the Navy in the decades to come? What are the
essential technological and warfighting trends for war at sea, and what are the most salient emerging challenges at the high end of the
conflict spectrum for naval forces? Have fundamental changes occurred that will require entirely new approaches to preparing for
future combat?
The question of cost will underscore this conversation. How specifically should the U.S. Navy recapitalize to remain dominant in any
environment given projected budget constraints? Unfortunately, technology and warfighting trends demand major changes in naval
warfare and consequent shifts in the purchase of platforms and systems. But new requirements may prove less costly than the current
trajectory of naval systems procurement.
Key Trends
Predicting the future is fraught with peril, but a dominant trend emerges from careful war gaming and operations research: the
proliferation of long-range precision strike (LRPS) systems.
However, several others should not be ignored:
* The growth of cyber capabilities and their relationship to the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum;
* The increasing use of remotely piloted and autonomous air, surface, and subsurface platforms for a wide range of warfighting
tasks; and
* The gradual adoption of new technologies with significant military potential, including directed-energy weapons, rail guns, and
others with the potential to change fundamental military balances.
Long-range precision strike systems. LRPS systems have unquestionably impacted the character of naval warfare, and they will
continue to do so. (See, for example, the trends in Chinese short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles reported since 2000 in
the Department of Defense’s annual reports on the military power of the People’s Republic of China.) Relying on data derived from a
construct of sensors and precision guidance as part of a larger system, these weapons are effective and survivable. (“Effective” means
that the weapon can rather reliably hit whatever it is aimed at, regardless of range to target, and put that target out of action.
“Survivable” means that the LRPS weapon cannot be destroyed or neutralized in ample numbers or sufficiently quickly, either at the
so-called left end [prior to launch] or right end [after launch] of the kill chain.) When envisioning a future war, one must now assume
that advanced missiles can reliably penetrate active defenses and destroy or neutralize their objectives.[1]
For LRPS systems to be effective, they must be coupled with well-developed operating procedures and C4ISR (command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) to provide timely targeting. Increasing numbers of states
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(and likely some non-state actors) are developing or acquiring these capabilities. Some technologies, such as accurate mapping, are
quite easy to obtain commercially, while others will require capital and know-how.
For two decades, the U.S. Navy has operated virtually anywhere unchallenged. But the appearance of relevant numbers of LRPS
systems by the 2000s and their evolving capabilities will threaten our long-held advantage in terms of missile range and accuracy. In
the coming decades, adversaries will continue to use them to support anti-access and area-denial strategies that will place our bases,
ships, and aircraft at great risk.[2] This is a new and dangerous state of affairs for U.S. naval forces.
The cyber domain and the EM spectrum. Advanced information and communications technologies affect all dimensions of society,
including warfare. Recent conflicts suggest that cyber operations will play an increasing role in future wars. Adversaries -- both state
and non-state organizations -- will attempt to exploit weaknesses within computers and networks to disrupt and destroy an opponent’s
military, government, and private capabilities.[3] Mitigating cyber vulnerabilities during all phases, levels, and categories of war, while
simultaneously exploiting those of potential adversaries, is essential. But how this develops will depend on how far future opponents
move away from a reliance on interconnected networks and how rapidly they acquire and use advanced cyber- and electronic-warfare
capabilities.
Given the cost disparity between cyber offense (relatively cheap) versus defense (expensive), and the multiple ways adversaries exploit
each others’ weaknesses, naval forces can expect that unprotected or non-isolated systems ranging from C4ISR and shipboard systems
to logistics chains will be disrupted -- temporarily if not permanently -- during periods of conflict.[4] Naval forces must operate under
decentralized command and control (C2) when warranted and maintain tight control of EM emissions to foil LRPS targeting, while
fielding computer networks in a simultaneously hardened and resilient manner.[5]
Platform varieties. After witnessing the impact of remotely-piloted systems on recent wars, both allies and potential adversaries are
acquiring unmanned systems in bulk.[6] Likewise, the technologies are being applied across the commercial and private sector,
resulting in an explosion of affordable, reliable, scalable, and adaptable systems with greater availability. Though these systems are
used primarily in permissive or semi-permissive environments, their use and effectiveness in a more demanding environment remains
to be seen.
The technology of autonomous systems has the potential to be integrated into all elements of the kill chain, affecting the way C2
systems, sensors and counter-sensors, decoys and deception, persistent surveillance, and weapons are used, protected, denied, and
destroyed. These systems are most influential where they offer opportunities that simply did not exist with, or offer distinct advantages
over, manned platforms. But the United States is rightly sensitive to the ethical and moral dimensions in adopting autonomous systems
for military use.[7] Other nations may be less concerned, which could become a tangible disadvantage in the future.
Emerging but unproven technologies. Directed-energy weapons and the rail gun, as well as improvements in speeds at which kinetic
weapons travel above and below the sea, might have larger implications. However, uncertainty still surrounds the ultimate impact of
these and other unproven weapons. While determined efforts to bring these technologies forward could arise, given the physics
involved, engineering challenges, and steep costs of developing new technologies, it seems unlikely that such systems will
fundamentally change the character and execution of war at sea within the timeframe discussed here. Of course, the intelligence
community must continually monitor the environment to avoid strategic surprise should a “break-out” system appear.
Implications for High-End Warfare at Sea
Many conditions that planners and strategists have safely assumed about C2 -- our ability to maneuver uncontested, and the security of
our supporting systems -- no longer exist. War plans, operations, tactics, and the entire DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities) gamut must adapt to the new circumstances, or we risk putting sailors in
grave danger and greatly weakening the contribution the Navy makes to national strategy.
Offensive versus defensive advantage. The fundamental implication of the proliferation of LRPS systems is that states possessing them
will be able to hold surface and air forces, as currently configured and employed, at risk far from their shores. Fixed bases, known
sanctuaries, and predictably moving platforms are especially vulnerable. As targeting and other capabilities improve, LRPS systems
will be able to engage farther into blue water. Depending on geography, they will reach critical bases and operational areas out to
hundreds (perhaps thousands) of miles. Fixed assets must rely on sheltering, redundancy, hardening, burial, obscurants, and decoys.
The ability of these systems to threaten mobile targets at a distance is largely dependent on the ability of adversaries to identify and
target platforms using emissions from across the EM spectrum. The effective defense of platforms must thus shift from an emphasis on
active defense to active deception and passive measures, such as counter-targeting through sensor denial (of radio frequency [RF] and
cyber), signature reduction, movement, and dispersal. Integrated air and missile defenses alone are not sufficient to protect individual
ships, aggregated forces, or permanent facilities as increasingly effective ballistic or cruise missiles proliferate.
Future wars in which LRPS systems predominate will involve efforts by all sides to find adversary platforms while hiding their own
from the enemy’s ISR and targeting systems. In the “hider/finder” competition, a mobile platform that can hide in clutter (such as
environmental or electromagnetic noise, dense traffic areas, on and under the water, etc.) will likely survive and be capable of offensive
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action. This will become the paramount element in contested seas, straits, and littorals. The offensive action of targeting and counter
targeting is decisive, and no navy ever triumphed at sea without having the offensive advantage.
No matter how heavily armored they are, ships cannot expect to retain their combat effectiveness after hits from specialized antiship
munitions, given the precision and lethality of LRPS systems. However, ships operating with effective emission control procedures that
take advantage of clutter from the land and sea may be able to effectively hide and operate. In this mode, larger ships can allow for
more offensive striking power, with greater numbers of vertical-launch system tubes and larger magazines. They are also more cost
effective.
Smaller ships will allow for dispersal, minimizing the effects of damage to a single platform to the aggregate striking power of the
force. In other words, navies would seem likely to adopt fewer numbers of large platforms with big loads of LRPS systems operating
back from the battle area (or protected within it, such as submarines), complemented by a larger number of small platforms with
shorter-range precision-strike systems operating well forward. These small ISR/strike platforms may be so small that they seemingly
contradict the intuitive definition of “platform,” being perhaps missile-like in size and other attributes.
The Return of Command at Sea
Planners and warfighters have heretofore presumed that operational units have unconstrained access to an increasingly clear, detailed,
and real-time picture of the battle space -- an advantage the United States could sustain indefinitely.[8] This may no longer be a safe
assumption. Recent conflicts suggest that cyber weapons can and no doubt will be used before, during, and after kinetic operations. C2
systems are especially at risk, and information-assurance dominance can no longer be assumed.
More challenging still, LRPS systems may be able to destroy vulnerable C2 nodes far from the fight. Rapid and focused kinetic attacks,
combined with cyber and EW activities, take advantage of our reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum and make rapid reconstitution
more problematic. Adversaries already recognize that it may be easier to disable, blind, or kill C2 within the battle space, not to
mention between higher and lower echelons, than to find, fix, and finish weapon platforms.
Given the proliferation of LRPS and over-the-horizon targeting systems, strict emission control must become the normal mode of
operations for all naval forces, with emissions and/or system power levels limited to only what is absolutely necessary. Those who do
not will be at a severe disadvantage in future conflicts, as forces emitting significant signals of any type may be found and destroyed.
Consequently, expectations regarding connectivity need to be modified, and training must be relentless with allowances for the
attendant increased risks such as collisions, groundings, and accidents during peacetime.
Military strategies and doctrines predicated on the instantaneous exchange of high-volume data anywhere in the world and in real time
will not apply in the next high-intensity conflict. It is crucial to learn how to continue to fight without networking and massive data
exchange. Commanders at all levels will have less information, and frontline commanding officers will likely require more freedom of
initiative and responsibility than thought possible for many years. Moreover, our independent, expeditionary Navy culture, seeded in
the 19th and early 20th centuries but diminished over the past quarter-century, requires greater emphasis in this environment. We must
build on this heritage.
New Approach to Logistics
For decades, U.S. military forces have benefited from superb logistical support provided from forward bases. For an expeditionary
navy, logistics and sustainment pose significant constraints and liabilities. In recognition of the increasing danger to American staging
areas, regional powers are developing missile forces that can reliably threaten those air bases and ports. Mobile and temporary nodes
are necessary to counter this. Cyber weapons will also increasingly target and degrade computer and communications systems
required by supply chains. Because military supply chains did not face this vulnerability during the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan
wars, strategists and planners have come to expect logistics advantages to continue. We must question such assumptions and plan
accordingly.
Although ordnance expenditure rates will certainly be far less than they were during wars prior to the widespread proliferation of
LRPS systems, it is questionable whether our relatively small stockpiles of precision munitions will prove sufficient to sustain a
prolonged conflict. The ability to surge LRPS production might be one of the most critical factors in future battlefield success. Yet the
demand for advanced logistics is not limited to reloads for shipboard magazines. For the immediate future, the availability of
petroleum, oil, and lubricants remains a limiting factor for Navy forces. A transition to smaller vessels staged forward might reduce
fuel-flow requirements to forward areas relative to the current force, but constant maneuver and high-speed operations will still
impose demands for large quantities of heavy bulk fuel. Sustained maritime operations at long distances, therefore, require ships with
sufficient sea-keeping ability, endurance, and magazine depth, sustained by a robust seaborne logistics force.
This observation raises another dimension of the future logistics challenge: High-end missiles and torpedoes are expensive. Stockpiles
are not limitless, and an opponent who has greater reserves or the ability to rapidly replenish them will have a distinct advantage in
anything other than a short, decisive war. A low ordnance stockpile requires exquisite targeting and use -- an especially challenging
environment characterized by effective C4ISR denial. Thus, opponents with the sufficient arsenal depth to “classify targets by
destruction” -- that is, to kill anything that might be a target -- have the advantage here. After two decades of assuming that conflict
will not escalate beyond our control (again, the enemy has a vote) or that high-end conflicts will end quickly and decisively, we must
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pay more attention to the issue of the sustained wartime production of sophisticated ordnance and counter-targeting expendables such
as decoys and obscurants.
Relevant Forces for the Future
Thinking about the future of warfighting is not merely an academic exercise; it’s a deadly serious business with profound implications.
Billions of dollars and perhaps thousands of lives are at stake in the decisions we make today about how the Navy configures itself to
fight in the future. Moreover, the extent to which the United States continues to field a dominant naval force will have a direct impact
on its strategic position throughout the 21st century. This author’s thoughts are not the final word, but a provocation to reconsider our
investments in equipment and human capital. How these trends and their resultant systems merge will have impacts that cannot be
clearly imagined.
The most immediately pressing question is which Navy forces in place now -- and in the intermediate future -- will be more relevant in
the years ahead? Based on the preceding analysis, it appears that the most significant forces for future warfare at sea include:
* Platforms employing standoff ordnance that penetrate high-end defenses;
* Platforms with an emphasis on offensive firepower to prevail at sea;
* Mobile and low-observable platforms and logistics, readily dispersed, and heavily protected or hidden by decoys, obscurants,
RF jammers, and signature control; and
* Forces minimally reliant on RF networks to be employed against high-end opponents using pre-planned responses and lowdata-rate, secure, and sporadic communications.
Conversely, less relevant forces of the future will include:
* Those dependent on fixed bases;
* Platforms within enemy missile ranges that have large signatures and are thus readily targetable;
* Systems dependent upon long-distance, high-data-rate RF networks;
* Platforms that must penetrate high-end defenses to deliver ordnance; and
* Platforms whose primary means of survival rests on active defense (i.e. shooting missiles with missiles).
As Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert has predicted, payloads will indeed become more important than platforms - with an emphasis on long-range strike systems and inherently passive defenses that will prove far less costly than efforts to provide
active defense of large and expensive ships. All of the requirements for effective counter-targeting -- emission control, RF obscurants,
sensor jammers, and decoys -- will cost only a fraction of a single high-end ballistic-missile defense interceptor, and can likely be
employed by the current force without a wholesale scrapping of extant ships and aircraft. Likewise, a future shift to lower-signature
platforms that are essentially weapons and sensor trucks -- and are inherently offensive rather than predominantly defensive -- will
provide much more bang for the buck.
The trends identified here, their implications, and the potential platforms and payloads that follow should stimulate further war
gaming, operations research, and traditional scholarship. We must re-invigorate our critical thinking and our actions if we are to meet
the challenges of future warfare at sea. It is essential to embrace the opportunities afforded by LRPS systems to field a Navy that can
deliver resolute offensive power to discourage would-be adversaries and prevail in a fight should deterrence fail. Given the remarkable
assets, analytic expertise, talent, and energy of the Fleet, we have all the means necessary to stay ahead of these challenges to remain
the premier global navy. Now is the time to put on our thinking caps, roll up our sleeves, and look beyond our bow, not in our wake.
The guided missile destroyer USS Preble (DDG-88) fires a tomahawk missile in a training area off the coast of California. But the United
States and its allies aren’t the only entities with advanced long-range precision strike (LRPS) technology. “In the coming decades,
adversaries will continue to use [LRPS systems] to support anti-access and area-denial strategies that will place American bases, ships,
and aircraft at great risk,” the author warns.
This artist rendering depicts the Office of Naval Research-funded electromagnetic railgun, a long-range projectile-launching weapon
that uses electricity instead of chemical propellants, installed on board the USNS Millinocket (JHSV-3). Although emerging
technologies have the potential to influence how the U.S. Navy responds to threats, “uncertainty still surrounds the ultimate impact of
[the railgun] and other unproven weapons.”
Information Systems Technician 2nd Class Brian Raines reviews the emission-control status on board the USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74)
in February 2013. “No matter how heavily armored they are, ships cannot expect to retain their combat effectiveness after hits from
specialized antiship munitions,” the author stresses. “However, ships operating with effective emission control procedures that take
advantage of clutter—may be able to effectively hide and operate.”
On 2 March, Cryptologic Technician Seaman Allen Stevenson loads antiship missile-defense chaff rounds in a decoy-launcher system
on board the USS Balaan (LHD-5). As the author notes, all of the requirements for effective counter-targeting -- including decoys -“will cost only a fraction of a single high-end ballistic-missile defense interceptor.”
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